Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah v. Myron A. Hamilton : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Curtis C. Nesset; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Hamilton, No. 20646.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/661

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME 2 ; UI H • : I I HE ST i TE : IF UT ii! H
HATE OF UTAH,
P1 a i n t i f f / R e s j:: : ; J : , fil ::!' :i it t ,

A, HAMILTON,
ijeIendaet/Apjji[ i i IIII
in mi in in

||l

Appeal
i

null!

I respond

III

i I MI

MI

III III

iI

I MI1

from

I'm

'.' i '

i

III in I 1 , w x l k i n s o n i Jiin11II
I

III

i I

t o an f»Hr fi n> i

in L t o Obey a i

"

I I ni II I
i in i i m

11 i
i i

i i i i

imi

'

"

i

i n f e r e n c e w i t h a I1

"

"

i j'ii, ciiiJ lli> Drive
of Ut*ili r S a l t 1,
II

in ii'

Ft b 1

II

mi ni ni

2£ • »•• i

I
ni mi mi ni ni 11 mi mi

i ni i II

II

ni

i ni ni ni ni II

''< •

i: i ID L. WILKINSON
i II It: It , :: i: i i sy General
i ! 1! , I ;j:; , i y for Respondeni
236 Skate Capitol Bu i. 1111 in
S I i '. 'take City, Utah H

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i IIII in i

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaint iff Responden-fvs..MYRON A. HAMILTON,

C

Defendant/Appellant

f ...

: I

C a t e g o r y Ko. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from affirmance »r H*-

, I - A =»

1 strict

C o u r t , in and for Salt Lake C o u n t y , 'State of U t a h , the H o n o r a b l e
H o m e r F. W i l k i n s o n , J u d g e , p r e s i d i n g :

of c o n v i c t i o n s of F a i l u r e

to Respond to an O f f i c e r ' s Signal to S t o p , a C l a s s A M i s d e m e a n o r ,
F a i l u r e t o Obey a P o l i c e O f f i c e , a C l a s s B M i s d e m e a n o r ;
I n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a Public S e r v a n t , a Cl.~i.ss b M i s d e m e a n o r ; •
Speeding ami Mlf D r i v e r ' s L i c e n s e o n P e r s o n ; in t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t ,
State o f U t a h , Salt L a k e C o u n t y , Sandy D e p a r t m e n t , t h e
H o n o r a b l e C . B a i l e y •?•-•=*-: r\:--\: '•—:

Judge, presiding.
CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Appellant
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4] 1 ]
Telephone: 532-5444

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

Statement of Facts .

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS
APPEAL

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO
REPRESENT THE APPELLANT AND IN
NOT OBTAINING A WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL
FOR MR. HAMILTON ON THE FIRST
APPEAL

5

6

.11

CONCLUSION

14

ADDENDUM A

16

ADDENDUM B

17

ADDENDUM C

18

ADDENDUM D

.....

ADDENDUM E

19
.....

ADDENDUM F. .

20
21

X
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Argersinger v. Hablin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)

10

Carnbey v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962)

9

Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) . . . . . 1 0
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)

6

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) . . . . 11,12
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.
(1985)

, 83 L.Ed.2d 821
12

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) . . . .

9

Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1981). . 9
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

6

Hamilton v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1961)

6

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1958)

8

Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972) . . .

9

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

6

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)

11,12

State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1986) . . 10
State v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977) . . .

9

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979)

6,7

State v. Hamilton, 22 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah 1985) . 5
State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981)

9

State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983)

5

Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945). . . . .

7

Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978) . . . .

7,8

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES CITED
Page
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (1953 as amended)

11

Utah Code Ann. §77-35-8 (1953 as amended)

7

Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended)

5,12

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution

5,7

Article 1, Section 12, Utah State Constitution . . .

6,7,11

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the Utah Supreme Court have jurisdiction to

consider this appeal?
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

(a) failing to inform the defendant of his constitutional
right to be represented by an attorney at trial, (b) failing
to appoint an attorney, and (c) failing to secure a waiver
of right to counsel?
3.

Did the District Court commit reversible error

by (a) failing to inform the appellant of his constitutional
right to be represented by an attorney on appeal, (b) failing
to appoint an attorney, and (c) failing to secure a waiver of
right to counsel?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

vs.

:

MYRON A. HAMILTON,

:

Case No. 20646

:

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the affirmance of convictions
and sentences imposed for Failure to Respond to an Officer's
Signal to Stop, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-13.5 (1953 as amended); Failure to Obey a
Police Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-13; Interference with a Public Servant, a Class
B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-301; Speeding, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-46; and No Driver's
License on Person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-2-15.
The appellant was found guilty following a jury trial which
occurred on February 27 and 28, 1984 in the Fifth Circuit Court,
Sandy Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable C. Bailey Sainsbury, Judge, presiding.

The same

court sentenced the appellant to thirty days in the county
jail and to pay a fine of $998.00. An appeal was taken to the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ite of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presidj.

The convictions were affirmed on appeal.
Statement of Facts
On November 5, 1983, at approximately 6:30 p.m. in the

^a of 350 West 10600 South, in Salt Lake County, the defendant,
ron A. Hamilton, was observed in a white Chevrolet pick-up
th no visible license plates, traveling at a high rate of
eed.

When police officers turned on their overhead light

e vehicle did not respond.

After an officer turned on his

otlight to get the driver's attention, the defendant pulled
er (R.241-242).r
As the officer approached the vehicle a verbal alterca.on occurred, and the officer asked Mr. Hamilton to produce
„s driver's license.

The defendant

refused and the officer

lformed him he was under arrest (R.,242).
When the officer requested the defendant step out of
Ls truck, the defendant refused and left the scene to return to
Ls home.

The officer followed and with the assistance of other

fficers, placed Mr. Hamilton under arrest (R.242).
At trial before the Circuit Court, the defendant requested
he court appoint him the counsel of his choice (R.465-67).
he request was denied because the requested counsel was not a
tember of the Utah State Bar (R.466).

The defendant subsequently

;erved as his own counsel, a situation which did not further
:oncern the trial judge.

There was no inquiry by the court about

:he wisdom of the defendant's self-representation or about the
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant's financial ability to retain private counsel.

The

defendant was never informed about the possibility of free
representation and no waiver of the right to counsel was ever
made (Addendum A ) . ^
The defendant pleaded guilty to having no driver's
license on his person, and the jury found him guilty of failure
to obey a police officer; failure to respond to an officer's
signal to stop; speeding; and interferance with a public servant.
The jury found the defendant not guilty of improper display of
license plates, and of assault on a police officer (R.164-165).
The defendant was fined $998.00 and sentenced to thirty days
in jail (R.336-337).

.

On appeal from the conviction to the Third Judicial
District Court, the defendant raised the right to counsel issue.
In his appeal brief to the Third District Court, Mr. Hamilton
questioned the lower court's grasp of the representation issue,
claiming, "The defendant was openly denied counsel of any kind,"
(Addendum B ) .
In his memorandum decision, Judge Wilkinson affirmed
the Circuit Court's ruling as to the defendant's right to nonattorney counsel (R.243).

All other issues were ruled in

Repeated attempts were made by the Salt Lake Legal
Defender's Office to obtain a tape or the transcript of the trial.
As of the date of the filing of this appeal neither the Sandy
Circuit Court, the Third District Court, nor the Utah Supreme
Court can locate the tapes/transcripts.

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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/or of the lower court (R.241-247) (Addendum C).

In addition,

tfever, the District Court failed to inquire about the
fendant's financial ability to hire an attorney on the appeal.
e defendant was never alerted to the possibility of free
presentation and no record can be found of a waiver of the
ght to counsel (Addendum D) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The appellant, Myron A. Hamilton, first contends that
.e Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal of
Le district court decision since the issue on appeal is of a
mstitutional nature.

Such appeals are specifically allowed

ider Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended).
Next the appellant argues that the circuit court which
cied the case erred by not inquiring into the defendants
Lnancial ability to hire counsel and/or in the alternative,
y not securing a waiver of the right to the assistance of
ounsel.

Since the defendant subsequently received a conviction

nd a jail sentence without assistance of counsel, those convicions should be reversed.

The district court which heard the

irst appeal erred by failing to fully address the right to
lounsel issue.

While the district court affirmed the lower

:ourt's ruling as to counsel of choice, it failed to discuss
;he broader issue of assistance of counsel at trial or the waiver
Df that right.
Finally, the appellant contends that his right to assistance of counsel was further violated during the appeal process
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when he was neither afforded assistance of counsel nor asked
to wavie that right.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL.
In Utah, the right of an appellant, whose case originated in a circuit court, to appeal the decision of a district
court is governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended).
That statute states, in pertinent part:
Appeals shall also lie to the district
courts from the final judgment of the
circuit courts, and from the final judgments of the juvenile courts, except
where a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court is expressly provided for. The
decisions of the district court on
appeals from circuit courts shall be
final except in cases involving a constitutional issue.
This provision was upheld by this Court in State v.
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983).

The Court stated, "[The

statute] clearly sets forth the Legislature's intent that this
Court hear appeals from district courts in all cases involving
a constitutional issue."

_Id. at 444.

See, also, State v.

Hamilton, 22 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Utah 1985).

The only requirement

is that the appellant must raise a "constitutional issue."
In this case, which originated in the Fifth Circuit
Court, the appellate raises the issues of right to trial and
appellate counsel.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the

sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as
-5-
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.1 as article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.

The

reliant has therefore met the preliminary burden of raising
constitutional issue and this appeal may be heard by this
art.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT THE
APPELLANT AND IN NOT OBTAINING A
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
The record in this case reveals that during a preliminary
oceeding, Mr. Hamilton attempted to receive legal assistance
om an unnamed individual who was not a licensed attorney
L. 465-67).

The trial judge subsequently refused to hear the

Ldividual since he was not a member of the Utah State Bar
1.466)o

As a result of that ruling the defendant served as

Ls own counsel during all stages of the criminal prosecution,
icluding his appeal to the Third District Court.

While the

trial judge did recommend that the defendant secure counsel,
here was no inquiry as to the defendant's ability to pay for
ounsel nor was there any suggestion that free assistance could
e provided on request (R.466-469).
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the
ssistance of an attorney at all critical stages in a criminal
>rosecution.

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979); Coleman v.

ilabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).

In Powell v.

Uabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), the United States Supreme Court
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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said that an accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.

Without it, though

he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence."

This guiding

hand of counsel is needed at critical stages of the prosecution
"lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater than the
law of the State exacts for the offense which they in fact and
in law committed."

Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485, 489

(1945) .
The right to assistance of counsel is guaranted by the
sixth amendment to the Constitution

of the United States as

well as article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.

To

insure that an accused is assisted in preparing a defense, Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-8 (1953 as amended) states:
A defendant charged with a public
offense, other than an infraction,
who is indigent and unable to obtain
counsel has the right to court-appointed
counsel if he faces a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty, or
the right to represent himself.
When a person is charged with an offense which may be punished
by imprisonment, the accused is clearly entitled to the assistance
of counsel.

Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978).

Further-

more the standard of practice which is expected of appointed counsel
is not small. As this Court stated in State v. Gray, 601 P.2d
918 (Utah 1979) :
Right to counsel is not satisfied by
a sham or pretense of an attorney but
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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an accused is entitled to assistance
of a competent member of the bar who
shows a willingness to identify himself with interest of the accused and
present such defenses as are available.
Id. at 920, fn. 5.

i,

In this case, the appellant, Myron Hamilton, was not
only charged with jailable offenses, he was sentenced to a term
of incarceration (R.164-65).

However, Mr. Hamilton was unrepre-

sented by an attorney at any stage of the proceedings against him
(Addendum A ) .
The question of whether an accused is indigent and thus
unable to employ his own counsel is a question of fact and is to
be determined by the trial court.

Webster v. Jones, supra.

Additionally, if an accused wishes to represent himself, thus
waiving his right to assistance of counsel, such a waiver must
be made knowingly and intelligently.
The requirement that a trial court explore the accused's
waiver was delineated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1958).
In that case, the United States Supreme Court noted:

>
a

*

It has been pointed out that "courts
indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." . . . The constitutional right of an accused to be
represented by counsel invokes, of
itself, the protection of a trial
court, in which the accused—whose
life or liberty is at stake--is without counsel. This protecting duty
imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent
and competent waiver by the accused.
-8-
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While an accused may waive the right
to counsel, whether there is a proper
waiver should be clearly determined by
the trial court/ and it would be fitting
and appropriate for that determination
to appear upon the record. Id, at 464,
465 (emphasis added).
The failure of the trial court to inform an accused
offender of his right of counsel, or in the alternative, to
secure a knowing waiver of that right is reversable error.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); State v. Ruple, 631
P.2d 874 (Utah 1981); State v. Dominquez, 564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977);
Kuehmert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839 (Utah 1972).

In addition, in a

slightly different context (presence of counsel during police
interrogation), the state bears a heavy burden of showing that
a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to assistance of counsel and every reasonable presumption must
weigh against waiver.

Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska

1981) . The same burden should apply to the state in cases involving waiver of right to counsel at trial.
Finally, waiver of right to counsel cannot be presumed
from an empty record.

In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 at

516 (1962) the Supreme Court stated:
silent record is unpermissible.

"Presuming waiver from a

The record must show, or there

must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused
was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer.

Anything less is not waiver."

While this issue has

apparently not been raised in Utah in the context of right to
counsel, this Court had stated on at least two other occasions
-9-
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that when important constitutional rights are at stake, waiver
will not be presumed from a silent record.

Chess v. Smith, 617

P. 2d 341 at 345 (Utah 1980) (right not to appear in prison clothes)
and State v. Cook, 26 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 at 22 (Utah 1986) (right
to a jury trial in criminal cases).
In the present case the circuit court trial judge made
no attempt to discover the financial ability of Mr. Hamilton
to retain private counsel.

There was no discussion in which the

court advised Mr. Hamilton he could obtain appointed counsel
(Addendum A ) .

Further, not once did the trial court warn of the

consequences of self-representation.

Mr. Hamilton was allowed

by the trial judge to stand alone, unaided by the assistance
of counsel and unaware of the dire consequences of representing
himself.

Finally, the State can demonstrate no place in the

record in which the appellant waived his right to counsel.

As

a result, he was denied his constitutional right to counsel.
The appellant, representing himself on the first appeal
raised this issue in the district court.

Mr. Hamilton's brief

stated in part:
The Defendant was openly denied counsel
of any kind. Defendant was present
and his counsel was present and ready
to aid the Defendant but was forbidden
to act or counsel the Defendant.
•v- The Trial Judge sentenced the Defendant
to 56 days in jail. This was done in
violation of Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972): "Under the rule we
announce today, every judge will know
when the trial of a misdemeanor starts
that no imprisonment may be imposed,
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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even though local law permits it,
unless the accused is represented
by counsel."
(R.355, Addendum B.)

While the brief went on to address an

issue of counsel of choice, the District Court did not address
denial of right to counsel in its decision (Addendum C ) . The
appellant now contends that this issue should have been addressed
by the district court.

Because the appellant was not represented

by counsel during the proceedings in the circuit court and because
he did not waive his right to counsel, his convictions should be
reversed.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR MR. HAMILTON
ON THE FIRST APPEAL.
Neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
require a state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant on
a discretionary appeal.

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

However, if an appeal is not discretionary but rather an appeal
of right, an indigent appellant's rights, including the right
to counsel, cannot be arbitrarily cut off.

Id.. To do otherwise

has been held to violate both due process and equal protection.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
The right of appeal is a constitutional right in the
State of Utah.

Article I section 12 of the Constitution of Utah

gives the accused the right to appeal in all cases (Addendum E ) .
Utah Code Ann. §77-32-1 (1953 as amended) guarantees the constiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tutional right of appeal for indigent defendants.

That provision

states, in pertinent part:
The following are minimum standards
to be provided by each county, city
and town for the defense of indigent
persons in criminal cases in the
courts, o . of the state: . . .
(5) Include the taking of a first
appeal of right. . . .
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §78-3-5 (1953 as amended) states that the
first appeal from the circuit court is to the district court
(Addendum F).

No restrictions are placed on the appeal; the

appeal is an appeal of right, not a discretionary appeal. Therefore, as stated in Ross v. Moffitt, all rights are applicable
including the right to counsel.

Further, the right to assistance

of counsel applies regardless of the merits of the case.
v. California, supra.

Douglas

Finally, the appellate level right to

counsel also includes the right to effective assistance of
counsel.

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S.

, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).

The reasons for the necessity of counsel on appeal were
clearly outlined in Evitts v. Lucey:

-

Just as a transcript may by rule or
custom be a prerequisite to appellate
review, the services of a lawyer will
for virtually every layman be necessary
to present an appeal in a form suitable
for appellate consideration on the
merits. . . . Therefore, Douglas v.
California, supra, recognized that
the principles of Griffin required
a State that afforded a right of
appeal to make that appeal more than
a "meaningless ritual" by supplying
an indigent appellant in a criminal
case with an attorney. . . . [T]he
attorney must be available to assist
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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in preparing and submitting a brief
to the appellate court. [Citations
omitted.]
83 L.Ed.2d at 838. Further, the Court stated:

"A first appeal

as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due
process of law if the appellant does not have the effective
assistance of an attorney."

Id., at 830.

Presumably, the right to assistance of appellate counsel
could be waived.

However, such a waiver would have to meet the

same standards required for waiver of the right to assistance
of trial counsel.

(See Point II, supra.).

The waiver would

have to be knowingly and intelligently made and be a part of
the record.

Nothing less would meet constitutional standards.

In the present case, Mr. Hamilton appealed his circuit
court convictions to the district court (R.352-358).

However,

the entire appeal process apparently transpired solely on paper.
The record reveals no personal appearance by either party before
the district court.

Furthermore, the record reveals no instance

in which Mr. Hamilton was questioned concerning his ability to
afford an attorney for the appeal process.

The record is similar

silent regarding a waiver of right to assistance of appellate
counsel and the possible consequences of self-representation.
Mr. Hamilton was never informed of the availability of appointed
counsel and proceeded through the appellate process without
assistance of counsel (Addendum D ) .
In bringing an appeal of right from his conviction,
Mr. Hamilton was attempting to demonstrate that his conviction
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and the consequent loss of liberty was unlawful.

To prosecute

the appeal, the appellant faced an adversary proceeding that—
like a trial—was governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding.

An unrepresented

appellant, like an unrepresented defendant, is unable to protect
the vital interests at stake.2

The district court, by not

investigating the issue of assistance of counsel and by not
securing a waiver of that right deprived Mr. Hamilton a fair
review of his convictions in the lower court.
CONCLUSION

j

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant, Myron
Hamilton, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his
case to the circuit court with an order for a new trial with
the assistance of counsel.

In the alternative, the appellant

seeks reversal of the district court decision on his appeal of
right and remand of his case to the district court with an
order permitting a new appeal at the district court level with
the assistance of counsel.
2
A perfect illustration of how inadequate a layperson
is in protecting his rights is shown by this case. While Judge
Wilkinson notes that the issues presented on appeal are "not
very clear from Defendant's pleadings" (R.231) he fails to
discuss the right to counsel issue beyond a limited ruling as
to counsel of choice (R.233). Had an attorney been appointed
the confusion would have never occurred and Mr. Hamilton's
rights would have been protected.

•; - ' • -i
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Respectfully submitted this

-2 £0
2> ~—

day of February,

1986

CURTIS C. NESSET ^
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, CURTIS C. NESSET, hereby certify that four copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
-2. 5£
Lake City, Utah 84114, this -2
day of February, 1986.
^OLAJU^

C

- TLg^jgV-

CURTIS C. NESSET I
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED by

this

February, 1986.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
MYRON A. HAMILTON,

Case No. 20646

Defendant/Appellant
I, MYRON A. HAMILTON, being first duly sworn according
to law on my oath depose and say:
1.

I am the appellant in the above-entitled case.

2.

At no time during the pendancy of the proceedings

in the Fifth Circuit Court was any inquiry made concerning my
financial ability to retain private counsel.
3.

At no time during the proceedings in Fifth Circuit

Court was an attorney appointed to represent me.
4.

At no time during the proceedings in the Fifth

Circuit Court did I waive my right to an attorney.
DATED this p£f

<~&ay of January, 1986.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

c37^

day

January, 1986.

^•^^c^eCJ7
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires
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Myron A. Hamilton
9429 South 1300 West
Township 3 S R 1 W
Salt Lake County, Utah

84065

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

]

Plaintiff

vs.

]'

Case No. 83 TFSY 493

]i

Appeal No.

MYRON A. HAMILTON
i

APPEAL BRIEF

Accused/Appellant
COMES NOW the Defendant to move the District Court to reverse
the conviction of the Defendant in the instant case for the following causes.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant was found guilty of failure to obey a police officer,
interference with a public servant, failure to respond to officer's
signal, speeding, and no driver's license on person.

The Defendant

was acquitted of improper display of license plates and assault on a
police officer.
The Prosecution insisted upon moving forward in a jury trial
over the objection of the Defendant.

The Defendant refused to plead,

challenged the jurisdiction and demanded all of his Rights.
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The Defendant was summarily arraigned befor Judge David Brown.
The Defendant entered no plea whatsoever and did not understand any
of the alleged charges that had been brought by Officer Shane Smith.
Defendant was arrested November 5, 1984 and booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail as a John Doe.
name of the Defendant.

The arresting officer new full well the

There were some 9 charges brought against

the Defendant, some of which, apparently, the prosecuting attorney
and the officers in question dismissed..

Officer Shane Smith apparent-

ly gave the Defendant a life sentence in jail for he failed to take
the Defendant to any magistrate to be arraigned.

The Defendant had

to secure a Writ of Habeas Corpus to be released from the Salt Lake
County Jail on November 7th.
The case was transferred from Judge David Brown's jurisdiction
to a Circuit Judge by the name of Bailey Sainsbury to be heard in
Sandy.

A notice of arraignment was scheduled for January 11, 1984,

befor Judge Sainsbury.

A Motion for Dismissal was forwarded to

Judge Sainsbury challenging any and all jurisdiction over this matter.
The Court denied the dismissal and proceeded further with the arraignment.

A Motion for Discovery under Rule 16(B) was entered upon the

court and the prosecuting attorney on December 19, 19 83. The proceedings at the arraignment hearing and Motion for Dismissal Due to Incomplete Discovery was entered.
the dismissal.

It was denied by the Judge along with

A Motion for Counsel of Choice was entered upon the

court on the 11th of January and a brief in support thereof.

A Notice

and Demand for Veniremen to Number 12 was also introduced along with
a Notice and Demand for Rights Sua Sponte.

All were denied by the

court.
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The Defendant had to notice up a motion hearing for the 6th of
February at which time the prosecuting attorney, Barbara Byrne, was
present to answer why Defendant had not been awarded proper discovery.
The Defendant fully intended to have depositions taken from arresting
officers and the court of its own volition denied the accused the
right to have depositions taken.

The court of its own volition denied

the Defendant any further information than what had been granted by
the prosecuting attorney, at which time a Motion for the Plaintiff
to Show Constraining Need, a Motion and Demand For Time, Motion for
a Public Prosecutor and a Motion for Severance of Offenses were all
denied by the court.

All of the alleged offenses that had been charged

against the Defendant other than the speeding were brought against
the Defendant after a release from the officer and then without any
probable cause stated, the officer entered upon private property and
using a lethal, deadly weapon, took the Defendant under arrest stating
no charges whatsoever.
All of the alleged charges brought against the Defendant at this
scene stemmed from the illegal arrest, search and seizure of the
Defendant without probable cause.

Yet the Judge denied the Motion

for Severance of Offensed.
The Defendant entered 5 new motions on February 9, one for
Subpoena, a second Demand for Time and two others for depositions to
be taken and one for the prosecuting attorney to bring forth the radar
equipment used in the arrest, all of which were denied by the court.
II
The court has at every meaningful hearing along with the officers,
jailers and/or magistrate Brown denied the Defendant to have assistance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of counsel for his defense.

The Defendant was only granted 6 sub-

poenas when there were at least 5 of his own family that had to be
subpoenaed; therefore, the Defendant was fettered in his defense.
Under Rule 14 the Defendant is entitled to an unlimited supply of
subpoenas

for his defense.

The prosecuting attorney entered the

radar as admissible evidence after it had been denied as evidence
to the defense.

The prosecuting attorney was allowed to use it as

evidence.
The arresting officers did secure evidence from the Driver's
License Department that the Defendant had a valid Utah drivers license.
The court denied the Defendant to a grand jury indictment and a
public prosecutor to prosecute this action.

The court denied the

Defendant a common law jury as guaranteed to him by the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the iMagna Carta,
(Article II Paragraph 2.)
The Trial Judge did not seem to understand the difference between
a "lawyer to represent," and a "counsel to act and advise."
The Defendant was openly denied counsel of any kind.

Defendant

was present and his counsel was present and ready to aid the Defendant
but was forbidden to act or counsel the Defendant.
The Trial Judge sentenced the Defendant to 56 days in jail.

This

was done in violation of Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25: "Under
the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of
a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though
local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel."
Defendant moves for dismissal pursuant to the Trial Court's
error in denying the Defendant Unfettered counsel of choice.
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Ill
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ISSUE
The Salt Lake County Prosecutor prosecuted the case in the
name of the State of Utah.
The County Attorneys have no power to prosecute a criminal
action it must be done by a public prosecutor in the name of the
people of the State of Utah.

What have we done with the people?

How far can the Government supress them before they rebel.
Governments have powers not rights.

The County is a Corpora-

tion under the State and does not have the power to prosecute a
criminal case any more than Boise Cascade Corporation or Kennecott
Copper Corporation, or Albertson's Inc. does in a Criminal Case.
Powers not granted are prohibited,(Article X U.S. Const.)
Please refer to the rocord and see "MOTION FOR PUBLIC PROSECUTION
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO DISMISS" and the Brief in support thereof.
IV
DEMURRER DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL
The Traffic Courts routinely dismiss all constitutional issues.
This citizen is claiming right.

"Where rights are involved there

can be no rule making or legislation which could abrogate them
"Miranda vs. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 at 491.
Please refer to my "Writ of Error, Notice and Demand for Counsel,
Notice and Demand for Veneremen to Number 12, Motion for Subpoena
Duces Tecum, Motion for Subpoena, Jurisdiction, and Duties.
V
THE MAJOR FEDERAL QUESTION
The final question and perhaps the most significant question
is whether or not this person can be arrested on his own private
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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property without a warrant having never been given any reason for
the arrest.

The officers beat and kicked the Accused to a state of

unconsciousness, dragging him some 500 yards, paralizing his arms,
beating him about the head and face.

The officer using deadly force

in the unlawful arrest and unlawful detention.

The officers never

took the Defendant to a Magistrate according to Utah Code 77-7-23.
Instead they gave the Defendant a life sentence in the county jail
without a hearing of any kind before ^any Magistrate, when one lived
just next door to the Accused.
A Civil action has been initiated in the U.S. District Court
to settle the discrepancy between the arresting officers, the jailers,
the prosecutor and the Judge that tried this action.

The Judge Bailey

Sainsbury, after being served with a copy of the complaint and a
summons, still proceeded to prosecute this action, being a Defendant
in a civil case in the U.S. District Court, case number 84-148W.
May I suggest that in the interest of judicial expediency and
exonomy that this case and all charges pertaining to it, be overturned by the District Court.
Dated this

/ V

day of

/ 7 ^ ^ / ^

1984.

Respectfully submitted,
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day of

1984.

sYUiti^ / \ C^&^r
Notary Public residing in

My Commission Expires:
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I hand-delivered a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document to Barbara Byrne,
Salt Lake County Attorney on this

day of

rt^'

/I(a' c
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. CRA-84-12

:

MYRON A. HAMILTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

This matter comes before the Court on appeal from a jury
trial presided over by the Honorable C. Bailey Sainsbury in
the Fifth Circuit Court, Sandy Department, on the 27th and 28th
days of February, 1984.

During the trial the defendant pled

guilty to having no drivers license on his person, and the jury
found him guilty of failure to obey a police officer; failure
to respond to an officer's signal to stop; speeding; and interference
with a public servant.

The jury found him not guilty of improper

display of license plates, and of assault on a police officer.
The defendant appeals from these convictions on various grounds,
some of which are not very clear from defendant's pleadings.
The basic facts are that on the 5th day of November, 1983
at approximately 6:34 p.m. in the area of 350 West 10600 South,
Officer Smith observed a white Chevrolet pickup with no visible
license, plates,
which
speed
at a rapid rate.
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He checked the speed on radar, and the unit indicated the pickup
was traveling 51 mph in a residential area.

The Officer turned

on his overhead lights at approximately 900 West and 10600 South,
but the vehicle failed to respond.

The Officer then turned

on his spotlight to get the driver's attention, but the vehicle
did not stop.

It finally stopped at 1300 West and 10550 South.

As the Officer approached the vehicle, a verbal altercation
occurred, and the Officer asked the driver to produce his license.
The driver refused, and the Officer

informed him that he was

under arrest, and requested that he step out of the vehicle.
The driver refused, and sped north in his vehicle.
pursued, with his lights and siren activated.

The Officer

The pickup turned

into a dirt lane at approximately 9450 South 1300 West, and
drove through an open gate.

The young man jumped from the truck,

closed the gate, and locked it.

The Officer entered the property

with a shotgun, and demanded that the driver exit from the vehicle
and place his hands on the truck.

Officer Smith then asked

Officer Foster to handcuff the driver.

The driver pulled away,

and indicated that she wasn't man enough to handcuff him.

Officer

Smith then proceeded to handcuff the defendant, and a struggle
ensued, and Officers Gary Cox and Gene Wallace arrived, and
assisted

in subduing the defendant.

They then proceeded to

transport the defendant to the police vehicle, but a struggle
ensued at the closed gate, and the defendant and the Officer
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fell to the ground.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

A verbal altercation ensued, at which time

the defendant yelled, "police brutality."

The defendant was

then carried to the police vehicle and strapped in, and taken
to the Salt Lake county Jail, where he demanded to be taken
before a magistrate immediately.

For further facts and details

on the legal proceedings please refer to the briefs filed by
the plaintiff and defendant.

The Court having reviewed the

pleadings, the transcript and the briefs filed by the parties,
finds and rules as follows:
1.

The defendant requested the Court appoint him counsel

of his choice, being a person who had not been admitted to practice
law before the Courts of the state of Utah.

This Court finds

that Judge Sainsbury did not commit error in refusing to appoint
such counsel for an individual who is not permitted to practice
law in the state of Utah without a license.

It is also not

a denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the
court refuses to permit a non-lawyer to act as his counsel.
See, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-51-25 (1953 as amended); U.S. v.
Kelly, 539 F.2d 1199; U.S. v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750.
2.

The defendant contends that the County Attorney's Office

is not the proper office to prosecute a case of this type, and
they cannot prosecute the case on behalf of the people of the
State of Utah.

The Constitution of the State of Utah, and the

Utah statutes explicitly provide the County Attorney is a public
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prosecutor, and they are required to prosecute and conduct on
behalf of the State of Utah all prosecutions for public offenses
committed within the County.

See, the Utah Constitution, Art, 8,

Section 10; Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-18-1 (1953 as amended).
3.

The defendant suggests that he could only be arrested

upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, and therefore the arrest
by the officers was illegal.

The Utah law provides that a peace

officer may make a warrantless arrest where a public offense
is committed in his presence, and a public offense is defined
as including a misdemeanor.

See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-2,

and Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23.

An officer is

not required to inform the defendant, or give him notice of
intention to cause an arrest, or his authority for the arrest
when the person being arrested is actively engaged in the commission
of the offense, or is pursued immediately after the commission
of such an offense.
as amended.

See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-7-6 (1953

An officer may follow a defendant onto his private

property and effect the arrest when the offense was committed
in their presence, and they are in fresh pursuit of the suspect.
See, Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23.

There is ho merit to

defendant's contention that he was held for an unnecessary length
of time before being taken before a magistrate for arraignment.
It is not unusual to be arrested on a Saturday, which the defendant
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was, and be held until the following Monday when the court is
in session.
4.

The defendant alleges that he was prejudiced by the

Court only allowing the issuance of six subpoenas, but yet he
fails to state who he would have subpoenaed, and what further
evidence he might have brought in, and how he was prejudiced.
The court in its wisdom felt that the defendant may try to make
a mockery of the judicial system, and therefore exercised his
discretion, and limited the number of subpoenas that would be
issued.

See, Utah Code Ann., Section 77-35-33.

5.

The defendant also charges that his constitutional

rights were violated when he was not allowed to have a twelve-man
jury.

The Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-46-5 (1953 as amended)

provides that in non-capital cases juries may number less than
twelve.

This has been upheld in the case of Salt Lake City

v. West Gallery, Inc., 573 P. 2d 1283.

The U.S. Supreme Court

in the case of Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, held that it
was not a violation of an individual's constitutional right
to trial by jury.

The defendant also contends that there was

insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.

He makes some broad allegations that he was denied a

subpoena duces tecum in not being allowed to inspect the radar
gun, that he was denied a due process of law, tfiat there was
prejudice and bias, and that he received cruel and unusual punishDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment, but he fails to show how the evidence was insufficient,
or how he was denied any of his rights, or how he was prejudiced
by the denial of these rights.

When the defendant filed for

an appeal, he had the burden of showing that the evidence was
insufficient, and that reasonable minds would have reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crimes that he was charged
with and found guilty of.

See, State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443.

This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict, and can only upset that verdict if the Court
is convinced that reasonable minds, based upon the evidence,
could not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, State v. Garcia, 683 P.2d 60.

The Court finds, based upon

the foregoing, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to find the defendant guilty on all counts, and remands the
matter back to the Circuit Court for the imposition of sentence.
Dated this //yvn^day of December, 1984.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following this

I/JVKS

day of December, 1984.

Barbara J, Byrne*
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
3839 South West Temple, Suite 1A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Myron A. Hamilton
Defendant/Appellant
9429 South 1300 West
Township 3 S R 1 W
Riverton, Utah 84065
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
MYRON A, HAMILTON,

Case No. 20646

Defendant/Appellant
I, MYRON A. HAMILTON, being first duly sworn according
to law on my oath depose and say:
1.

I am the appellant in the above-entitled case.

2.

At no time during the pendency of the appeal in Third

District Court was any inquiry made concerning my financial
ability to retain private counsel.
3.

At no time during the appeal in Third District Court

was an attorney appointed to represent me.
4.

At no time during the appeal in the Third District

Court did I waive my right to an attorney.
DATED this

day of January, 1986.

-{SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

<SE:***

January, _1986.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

3>/?M*
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ART.

I, 5 12

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have tlie right 1o appear
and defend in person and by counsel, lo demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy Ihereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel, the aMondar.ee of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, bo compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wi'e shall not, be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against, his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
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78-3-5. Appeals from inferior courts. Appeals shall lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district courts,
on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions as are
or may be provided by law; and the decisions of the district courts on these appeals
shall be final, except in cases involving a constitutional issue . Appeals shall also
lie to the district courts from the final judgments of the circuit courts, and from
the final judgments of the juvenile courts, except where a direct appeal- 4,0 the
Supreme Court is expressly provided f'ir. The decisions of the district court on
appeals from circuit courts shall be final except in cases involving a constitutional
issue.
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